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ANOTHER INSTANCE OF THE 
ASHENFELTER DIP? 
CHARLES E. LOEFFLER* 
A number of recent studies examining the effects of imprisonment on 
ex-prisoner labor market outcomes have reported sizable pre-imprisonment 
employment drops.  The precise cause of these employment declines has not 
yet been identified.  The present Article provides evidence that these 
geometric declines in employment prior to imprisonment are largely 
unrelated to the long-term economic trajectories of the soon-to-be 
imprisoned, and instead reflect the mechanical disruption of labor market 
activity resulting from pre-imprisonment criminal case processing, 
especially pretrial incarceration. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, researchers and policymakers have increasingly 
focused their attention on the employment challenges facing former 
prisoners.2  This heightened interest has been driven by the recognition that 
ex-prisoners face numerous barriers to employment3 and by the hope that 
increasing employment among ex-prisoners could reduce their persistently 
high rates of criminal recidivism.4  Underpinning this policy perspective 
have been numerous studies estimating the impact that imprisonment has on 
the post-release labor market status and performance of ex-prisoners.5  In 
 
 2 See JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY 
105–23 (1st ed. 2003) (drawing on interviews with inmates, former prisoners, and prison 
officials to discuss shortcomings in prisoner reentry services); PRISONER REENTRY AND 
CRIME IN AMERICA 1 (Jeremy Travis & Christy Ann Visher eds., 2005) (discussing policies 
for prevention of recidivism); BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 
91 (2006) [hereinafter PUNISHMENT]; Bruce Western, The Impact of Incarceration on Wage 
Mobility and Inequality, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 526, 528 (2002) [hereinafter Impact of 
Incarceration] (noting that the stigma of incarceration, erosion of job skills, and erosion of 
social contacts are three key mechanisms explaining why prison and jail time are linked to 
slow wage growth). 
 3 Harry J. Holzer et al., The Effect of an Applicant’s Criminal History on Employer 
Hiring Decisions and Screening Practices: Evidence from Los Angeles, in BARRIERS TO 
REENTRY? THE LABOR MARKET FOR RELEASED PRISONERS IN POST-
INDUSTRIAL AMERICA [hereinafter “BARRIERS”] 117, 118 (Shawn Bushway et al. eds., 2007) 
(discussing multiple barriers for ex-offenders seeking jobs, including diminution of human 
capital during incarceration, general reluctance of employers to hire workers with criminal 
history records, and legal prohibitions on certain occupations hiring ex-offenders).  
 4 Eric  Holder,  U.S.  Att’y  Gen.  Remarks  at  the  European    Offenders     
Employment Forum held in Washington, DC (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/iso/
opa/ag/speeches/2010/ag-speech-101008.html [https://perma.cc/5BYM-YB4C] (noting that 
“stable employment is one of the keys to successful reintegration” and that “when quality, 
employment-centered programs are made available during and after incarceration, one 
demonstration showed they can cut recidivism rates in half”); see generally MATTHEW R. 
DUROSE ET AL., BUREAU JUST. STAT., RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 
2005: PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO 2010 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rprts
05p0510.pdf [https://perma.cc/TCD4-QGAG]. 
 5 See, e.g., John H. Tyler & Jeffrey R. Kling, Prison-Based Education and Reentry into 
the Mainstream Labor Market, in BARRIERS, supra note 3, at 227, 249 [hereinafter Prison-
Based Education] (examining effects of “prison GEDs” on post-release labor market 
integration); William J. Sabol, Local Labor-Market Conditions and Post-Prison Employment 
Experiences of Offenders Released from Ohio State Prison, in BARRIERS, supra note 3, at 
257, 297 (examining post-prison employment experience of offenders released from Ohio 
state prisons during 1999 and 2000); Haeil Jung, Increase in the Length of Incarceration and 
the Subsequent Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence from Men Released from Illinois State 
Prisons, 30 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 499, 529 (2011) (examining the impact of 
imprisonment on the employment and earnings of male prisoners in the State of Illinois); 
Jeffrey R. Kling, Incarceration Length, Employment, and Earnings, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 863, 
865 (2006) [hereinafter Incarceration Length] (using an instrumental variable model to 
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general, these studies have reported substantial long-term declines in 
employment and wages for the formerly imprisoned—declines that have 
been linked to changes in prisoner human capital, social capital, and social 
stigma.6 
Intriguingly, a number of these studies have also reported substantial 
employment drops among prisoners prior to imprisonment.7  This 
unexpected finding raises the possibility that prisoners might be 
experiencing pre-imprisonment labor market difficulties of a kind similar to 
those observed among participants in studies of job-training programs.8  In 
those studies, job-training program participants were found to have lower 
pre-program earnings as a result of employment difficulties that 
 
estimate the impact of imprisonment on employment and earnings); Becky Pettit & 
Christopher J. Lyons, Status and the Stigma of Incarceration: The Labor-Market Effects of 
Incarceration, by Race, Class, and Criminal Involvement, in BARRIERS, supra note 3, at 203, 
204 (examining effect of incarceration on employment and hourly wages in jobs covered by 
unemployment insurance through data gathered from individuals who were formerly 
incarcerated in a Washington State prison). 
 6 Western, Impact of Incarceration, supra note 2, at 541. But see Robert Apel & Gary 
Sweeten, The Impact of Incarceration on Employment During the Transition to Adulthood, 
57 SOC. PROBS. 448, 468 (2010) (finding that ex-prisoners are less likely to search for work 
rather than being less likely to find it); Robert J. LaLonde & Rosa M. Cho, The Impact of 
Incarceration in State Prison on the Employment Prospects of Women, 24 J. QUANTITATIVE 
CRIM. 243, 260 (2008) (reporting that changes in labor market outcomes for female prisoners 
are temporary and positive); Kling, Incarceration Length, supra note 5, at 874 (2006) (using 
an instrumental-variables model to find that there is little evidence that incarceration has 
adverse labor market consequences for the imprisoned in the medium term); Charles E. 
Loeffler, Does Imprisonment Alter the Life-Course? Evidence on Crime and Employment 
from a Natural Experiment, 51 CRIMINOLOGY 137, 156–58 (2013) (finding that the poor 
labor market outcomes of the imprisoned is a state shared by similarly situated non-
prisoners, suggesting that prison itself has little to do with the consistently weak labor 
market participation of ex-prisoners); David J. Harding et al., Imprisonment and Labor 
Market Outcomes: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 124 AM. J. SOC. 49, 49 (2018) 
(reporting evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects of imprisonment on labor 
employment outcomes by race for a population of Michigan prisoners). 
 7 See, e.g., LaLonde & Cho, supra note 6, at 247; Jung, supra note 5, at 506–07; Harding 
et al., supra note 6, at 68–69.  
 8 See James J. Heckman et al., The Economics and Econometrics of Active Labor Market 
Programs, in 3 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 1865, 1932 (Orley C. Ashenfelter & David 
Card eds., 1999) (examining active labor market policies and discussing methods used to 
evaluate their success in integrating the unemployed and economically disadvantaged); 
Orley Ashenfelter, Estimating the Effects of Training Programs on Earnings, 60 REV. ECON. 
& STAT. 47, 51 (1978) [hereinafter Effects] (reporting entry-into-training-program drops in 
employment); Orley Ashenfelter & David Card, Using the Longitudinal Structure of 
Earnings to Estimate the Effect of Training Programs, 67 REV. ECON. & STAT. 648, 648 
(1985) [hereinafter Longitudinal Structure] (illustrating the use and limitations of 
longitudinal earnings data for the estimation of job-training program effects). 
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subsequently caused them to enter job-training programs.9  If the 
imprisoned were found to be affected by a similar positive selection 
process, then it would suggest that even soon-to-be prisoners, with their 
often lengthy prior criminal records, were still sensitive to changes in their 
labor market status.10  Such a finding would lend support for classic 
sociological theories and more recent economic interpretations of criminal 
behavior, both of which predict that an individual’s decision to offend is 
influenced by their economic position and the unavailability of better 
economic alternatives.11  This finding is especially intriguing as the 
imprisoned have generally been thought to be less sensitive to changes in 
their labor market status due to their more substantial prior criminal 
involvement and disengagement from the formal labor market.12  On the 
other hand, if labor market participation prior to imprisonment were found 
 
 9 See, e.g., Ashenfelter, Effects, supra note 8, at 56–57 (discussing selection bias 
problem in data sets for studies on job-training program participation, particularly with 
respect to female trainees whose employment status may be the cause rather than the result 
of entrance to training).  
 10 See LaLonde & Cho, supra note 6, at 251 (noting that “the circumstances that make 
women more likely to enter prison in any given quarter may also make them less likely to be 
employed. . . . [W]e would expect relative employment rates to decline the closer a woman 
is to the quarter that she enters prison”); Jung, supra note 5, at 506 (noting that “earnings fall 
drastically over the two years prior to incarceration and then rebound immediately following 
release,” a phenomenon known as Ashenfelter’s dip). 
 11 See Robert Agnew, Foundation for a General Strain Theory of Crime and 
Delinquency, 30 CRIM. 47, 74–76 (1992) (arguing for the proposition that would-be 
offenders choose to commit crimes, especially property crimes, due to the unavailability of 
legitimate mechanisms to pursue socially acceptable goals); Albert K. Cohen, The Sociology 
of the Deviant Act: Anomie Theory and Beyond, 30 AM. SOC. REV. 5, 10 (1965) (discussing 
links between strain and deviance); Richard A. Cloward, Illegitimate Means, Anomie, and 
Deviant Behavior, 24 AM. SOC. REV. 164, 176 (1959) (synthesizing anomie and deviance 
theories of Durkheim and Merton to formalize the connection between deviancy and blocked 
economic opportunities); Robert K. Merton, Social Structure and Anomie, 3 AM. SOC. REV. 
672, 672 (1938) (introducing the idea that economic and social position can help explain 
why anomie and other forms of social alienation occur). 
 12 See, e.g., Richard B. Freeman, Crime and the Employment of Disadvantaged Youths, 
in URBAN LABOR MARKETS AND JOB OPPORTUNITY 201, 234–35 (George E Peterson ed., 1st 
ed. 1992) [hereinafter Disadvantaged Youths] (discussing finding that low unemployment 
rates during peak economic opportunities were “insufficient to deter large numbers of 
disadvantaged youths from crime”); Richard B. Freeman, The Economics of Crime, in 3 
HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 3530, 3541–44 (Orley C. Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 
1999) [hereinafter Economics] (discussing that high rates of unemployment frequently 
correlate with increased rates of crime but generally only among individuals who hold a 
favorable attitude towards offending); Richard B. Freeman, Why Do So Many Young 
American Men Commit Crimes and What Might We Do About It?, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 25, 
33–34 (1996) [hereinafter American Men] (criticizing the simplicity of the proposition that 
the collapse of the job market for unskilled labor contributed to the rise of criminal activity).  
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to be uncorrelated with participation in criminal activities, then there must 
be another explanation for the observed employment losses prior to 
imprisonment.13  In this Article, I argue for such an alternative explanation.  
Specifically, that much of the pre-imprisonment employment losses 
observed among the soon-to-be imprisoned can be explained by mechanical 
disruption of formal labor market activity as a result of routine pre-
imprisonment criminal case processing, especially pretrial incarceration.  
While this finding is of intrinsic interest in its own right, reinforcing the 
importance of scrutinizing the labor market consequences of pretrial 
incarceration,14 it also has important implications for the estimation of 
imprisonment effects.  Researchers often rely on data from the months prior 
to imprisonment to form the counterfactual condition for a within-person 
causal estimate of the effects of imprisonment.15  However, the co-
occurrence of pretrial incarceration and imprisonment suggests that this 
approach may not produce an isolated estimate of the effects of 
imprisonment, but instead a compound estimate of the joint effects of 
pretrial incarceration, conviction, and imprisonment if an insufficient lag 
structure is employed. 
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections.  Section I 
describes past research on the economic lives of the imprisoned.  Section II 
describes the analytical strategy and data used in this study.  Section III 
reports results.  And Section IV concludes with a discussion of the 
implications of the reported findings. 
I. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE IMPRISONED 
 Both before and after their incarceration, the imprisoned have 
consistently been observed to have extremely low levels of employment 
and very low wages while employed.16 The Bureau of Justice Statistics 
 
 13 See LaLonde & Cho, supra note 6, at 249–50 (discussing possible explanations for the 
pattern of declining pre-prison employment rates); Jung, supra note 5, at 506 (noting that 
earnings fall drastically over the two years prior to incarceration).  
 14 See Will Dobbie et al., The Effects of Pretrial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, 
and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 201, 236 
(2018) (finding adverse labor market consequences for pretrial detention). For recent studies 
on the effects of pretrial incarceration on case outcomes and criminal recidivism, see Paul 
Heaton, Sandra Mayson, & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of 
Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 728 (2017) (reporting adverse 
effects of pretrial detention on case outcomes).  
 15 Sabol, supra note 5, at 293–94; Tyler & Kling, Prison-Based Education, supra note 5, 
at 235; LaLonde & Cho, supra note 6, at 248; Jung, supra note 5, at 511.  
 16 See Sabol, supra note 5, at 268–72; Tyler & Kling, Prison-Based Education, supra 
note 5, at 237; Kling, Incarceration Length, supra note 5, at 867–68; Loeffler, supra note 6, 
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reported that prior to their incarceration, U.S. prisoners in 1997 were 
between two and three times as likely to be unemployed as the general 
population.17  More recent studies of prisoners from Florida, Ohio, and 
Washington State have reported pre-imprisonment unemployment rates 
ranging from 50% to 74%.18  These exceedingly high levels of pre-
imprisonment unemployment are followed by similar or even higher levels 
of long-term post-imprisonment unemployment, suggesting that the 
majority of prisoners are chronically unemployed both before and after their 
imprisonment.19  This dismal reality has generated considerable interest 
among researchers intent on understanding how imprisonment contributes 
to the labor market challenges of ex-prisoners20 and among policymakers 
hoping to boost the post-imprisonment labor market attachment of ex-
prisoners, with the expectation that doing so might reduce the persistently 
high levels of criminal recidivism also observed among ex-prisoners.21 
In spite of this recent interest in the relationship between 
imprisonment and employment, scholars have generally not examined the 
pre-imprisonment labor market experiences of prisoners in great detail.  
Most recent studies of the labor market effects of imprisonment report very 
little information on how employment and wages of soon-to-be imprisoned 
sample members vary over time.22  Intriguingly, however, for those studies 
 
at 157; Becky Pettit & Christopher J. Lyons, Incarceration and the Legitimate Labor 
Market: Examining Age-Graded Effects on Employment and Wages, 43 LAW & SOC. REV. 
725, 741–42, 750 (2009); CAROLINE HARLOW, BUREAU JUST. STAT., EDUCATION AND 
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS 1, 10 (2003).  
 17 CAROLINE HARLOW, BUREAU JUST. STAT., supra note 16, at 10.  
 18 Pettit & Lyons, supra note 5, at 210; Sabol, supra note 5, at 268; Tyler & Kling, 
Prison-Based Education, supra note 5, at 237.  
 19 See Pettit & Lyons, supra note 16, at 750; Kling, Incarceration Length, supra note 5, 
at 867–88; Pettit & Lyons, supra note 5, at 210; Sabol, supra note 5, at 268; Tyler & Kling, 
Prison-Based Education, supra note 5, at 236–37. 
 20 See Introduction to BARRIERS, supra note 3, at 2–6 (suggesting that greater use of 
incarceration may confine less-educated individuals to a secondary labor market that is 
characterized by low wages and erratic employment); Apel & Sweeten, supra note 6, at 449 
(examining whether currently existing penal policies produce worse life outcomes for 
incoming offenders than they did in earlier decades); Pettit & Lyons, supra note 16, at 727 
(examining age-graded effects of incarceration on post-release employment and wages in era 
of prison expansion); PRISONER REENTRY AND CRIME IN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 209 
(examining the realities of prisoner reentry at the peak of the era of mass incarceration); 
BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT, supra note 2, at 199 (exploring how incarceration and 
related practices contribute to social and economic inequality in the United States). 
 21 Holder, Remarks at the European Offenders Employment Forum, supra note 4 (stating 
the Department of Justice’s dedication to reentry programs focused on employment 
opportunities to reduce recidivism). 
 22 See, e.g., Loeffler, supra note 6, at 157. 
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that do report such information, employment declines have been 
consistently observed beginning at least several quarters prior to 
imprisonment.23  Rosa Cho and Robert LaLonde hypothesized that this 
pattern could be caused either by pre-imprisonment incarceration in county 
jails or by other changes in life circumstances correlated with entry into the 
prison—framing the basic alternatives to be tested in the present study.24  
Further, Haeil Jung suggested that the pre-imprisonment employment 
declines observed in his sample of male prisoners were similar to those 
observed in studies of job-training and other means-tested social welfare 
programs.25  None of these studies, however, have attempted to identify the 
specific causes of these precipitous declines in employment prior to 
imprisonment nor have they considered the larger methodological 
implications for the estimation of imprisonment labor market effects. 
The absence of a more substantial examination of the pre-
imprisonment labor market experiences of prisoners is surprising, since the 
quarters immediately prior to imprisonment offer an unparalleled window 
into the economic circumstances of soon-to-be prisoners at exactly the time 
that their involvement in criminal activities has brought them into contact 
with the criminal justice system.  The exact sequence of events leading up 
to imprisonment has the potential to shed light on whether economic 
distress in the form of unemployment or low wages while employed leads 
to participation in crime or, conversely, whether participation in crime leads 
to economic distress—a question with substantial implications for theories 
of criminal behavior and criminal justice policy. 
Early research on the relationship between economic conditions and 
crime rates at the macro-level posited a strong positive relationship between 
unemployment levels and aggregate crime rates.26  Most of these studies, 
however, only found a rather modest relationship between these two 
variables, indicating that while unemployment and crime may co-vary, the 
variance in unemployment is both insufficient and insufficiently correlated 
to explain the substantial changes that have occurred in the crime rate over 
the course of the twentieth century when most research was conducted.27  
 
 23 See Sabol, supra note 5, at 268–69; Tyler, supra note 19, at 242; LaLonde & Cho, 
supra note 6, at 254; Jung, supra note 5, at 506.  
 24 LaLonde & Cho, supra note 23, at 249–50. 
 25 Jung, supra note 23, at 506.  
 26 Theodore G. Chiricos, Rates of Crime and Unemployment: An Analysis of Aggregate 
Research Evidence, 34 SOC. PROBS. 187, 199 (1987). 
 27 See Freeman, Economics, supra note 12, at 3542. Scholars have also noted that 
aggregate unemployment has the potential to increase the motivation for crime in the 
population while simultaneously decreasing criminal opportunities. See David Cantor & 
Kenneth C. Land, Unemployment and Crime Rates in the Post-World War II United States: 
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At the individual level, stronger evidence of a relationship between 
unemployment and crime has been reported. A number of different 
longitudinal samples have all reported that employment is inversely related 
to adult crime rates,28 with Sampson and Laub’s work suggesting a strong 
negative correlation between job stability in early adulthood and subsequent 
crime participation.29 
Two challenges to the simplest interpretation of this work—that 
economic difficulties contribute to criminal offending—have been offered. 
The first challenge highlights the reciprocal and occasionally 
complementary nature of employment in legal and illegal markets.30 
Criminal acts and legal employment are not mutually exclusive ways of 
spending time or making a living. Given the sporadic nature of criminal 
offending, even income-generating criminal offending, participation in 
crime does not preclude participation in legal employment.31 Furthermore, 
legal employment can provide opportunities for criminal acts. The second, 
and more direct challenge, comes from research that shows that many 
individuals with more than minimal criminal involvement begin offending 
early in their lives, becoming socially embedded in criminal or delinquent 
social networks, which both increases the likelihood of criminal justice 
involvement and decreases the likelihood of being in a subsequent position 
to participate in the conventional labor market.32 The rapid declines in 
legitimate employment observed among soon-to-be prisoners potentially 
could speak to either of these schools of thought on the employment-crime 
relationship, assuming that the temporal ordering of criminal act, 
unemployment, and imprisonment can be reconstructed. 
 
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 50 AM. SOC. REV. 317, 329 (1985). More recent 
research, however, has suggested that changes in criminal opportunities explain very little of 
the already small unemployment and crime relationship. See, e.g., Gary Kleck & Theodore 
G. Chiricos, Unemployment and Property Crime: A Target-specific Assessment of 
Opportunity and Motivation as Mediating Factors, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 649, 666 (2002). 
 28 Terence P. Thornberry & R. L. Christenson, Unemployment and Criminal 
Involvement: An Investigation of Reciprocal Causal Structures, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 398, 400 
(1984); Ann Witte & Helen Tauchen, Work and Crime: An Exploration Using Panel Data, 
49 PUB. FIN. 155, 157 (1994). 
 29 Robert J. Sampson & John H. Laub, Crime and Deviance over the Life Course: The 
Salience of Adult Social Bonds, 55 AM. SOC. REV. 609, 617 (1990). 
 30 Thornberry & Christenson, supra note 28, at 399; see also Freeman, Economics, 
supra note 12, at 3543–44. 
 31 See Thornberry & Christenson, supra note 28, at 399; see also Freeman, Economics, 
supra note 12, at 3543–44.  
 32 See John Hagan, The Social Embeddedness of Crime and Unemployment, 31 
CRIMINOLOGY 465, 486 (1993) (arguing for the importance of adolescent crime and criminal 
justice involvement for understanding future adult unemployment). 
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The observed declines in employment prior to imprisonment have 
implications not only for theories of criminal behavior, but also for criminal 
justice policy.  If imprisonment is preceded by a decline in employment, it 
is possible that the criminally-involved are not as insensitive to the changes 
in the labor market as previously thought.33  This could suggest that policies 
designed to limit this rapid decline in employment or intervene earlier in 
this decay process might be able to limit further declines in employment 
and subsequent contact with the criminal justice system—an incredibly 
costly outcome for all involved.  However, the best test for such a 
relationship is not whether employment decreases prior to imprisonment, 
but whether employment decreases prior to the arrest leading to 
imprisonment.  The arrest is the clearest available signal of initial or 
renewed criminal involvement through initial contact with the criminal 
justice system.  Employment declines prior to arrest would indicate that 
unemployment might be contributing to criminal involvement.  On the 
other hand, the absence of employment declines prior to arrest would 
reaffirm the perspective that an individual’s participation in criminal 
behavior, even among individuals with connections to the formal labor 
market, is not particularly sensitive to changes in labor market status. 
Finally, the methodological implications of pre-imprisonment declines 
in employment are not only of interest in their own right, but also because 
the empirical reality of a precipitous decline in pre-imprisonment 
employment and earnings has important methodological implications for 
estimates of the labor market effects of imprisonment.  If employment and 
wage trends leading up to imprisonment change swiftly due to pre-
imprisonment criminal justice contact or other endogenous events, then 
conventional estimation strategies could produce biased estimates of the 
effects of imprisonment.34  Within-person analytical strategies for 
estimating the individual-level effects of imprisonment rely on stability of 
the individual-level employment and wage trends prior to imprisonment to 
estimate the implied or explicit counterfactual of what an imprisoned 
individual’s life would have been like in the absence of prison.  One 
common solution to the estimation problems created by the declining pre-
imprisonment wage trends is to compare prisoners’ post-release 
employment and wages to their employment and earnings several quarters 
prior to any short-term pre-imprisonment instability—an approach 
 
 33 Freeman, American Men, supra note 12, at 30–36; Freeman, Economics, supra note 
12, at 3542–43.  
 34 See JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JORN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS 
ECONOMETRICS 230 (2009).  
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implemented and well-described in prior work.35  Such an approach, 
however, requires the additional assumption that no confounding processes 
are at work during the period of instability immediately prior to the 
treatment of interest, in this case imprisonment.  The presence of any such 
confounding social processes would mean that prisoners, instead of being 
observed before and after an isolated experience of imprisonment, would be 
observed in a slightly but critically different counterfactual condition—
before and after receipt of a compound treatment consisting of arrest, 
conviction, and possibly pretrial incarceration.  An estimate of this 
compound treatment may still have some theoretical value, as it captures 
the effects of an entire cycle through the criminal justice system, but its 
implications for penal policy are far less clear. 
For all of these reasons, it is important to better understand why 
employment and wages fall so rapidly in the quarters before imprisonment.  
II. DATA AND METHODS 
The data in this study were drawn from the electronic records of the 
Circuit Court of Cook County (hereinafter Circuit Court).  The Criminal 
Division of the Circuit Court handles all non-federal felony criminal cases 
originating in Cook County, Illinois.36  As such, cases range from retail 
theft to homicide, although the majority of cases involve illegal drug 
distribution or property theft.37  This distribution of cases is typical of large 
urban county court districts in the United States, which have seen the 
fraction of their caseloads devoted to drug cases increase steadily in the last 
three decades.38 
A sample consisting of all felony cases initiated in the Circuit Court 
between 2000 and 2005 where the defendant was subsequently convicted 
and sentenced to imprisonment was identified from the records of the Clerk 
of the Circuit Court of Cook County (N=127,803).39  In order to avoid 
contaminating the estimates of imprisonment’s effects on prisoner 
employment with the effects of previous imprisonments, the sample of 
cases was further limited to individuals who had not been sentenced to 
imprisonment for the fifteen years prior to their first sentence to 
 
 35 See, e.g., LaLonde & Cho, supra note 6, at 248 (discussing methodology and 
statistical model).  
 36 See BUREAU JUST. ASSISTANCE, REVIEW OF THE COOK COUNTY FELONY CASE PROCESS 
AND ITS IMPACT ON THE JAIL POPULATION 4 (2005).  
 37 See Charles E. Loeffler, supra note 6, at 145.  
 38 THOMAS H. COHEN & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU JUST. STAT., FELONY 
DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COURTS, 2006, at 3 (2010).  
 39 BUREAU JUST. ASSISTANCE, supra note 36, at 35.  
2019] PRE-IMPRISONMENT EMPLOYMENT DROPS 825 
imprisonment in the period between 2000 and 2005 (N=61,145).  These 
records were linked to statewide criminal history records using fingerprint 
identifiers and supplemented with state quarterly UI-earning data for 
sample members from the Illinois Department of Employment Security 
(IDES).40  Because nearly half of sample members with either missing 
necessary linking information or superficially-valid linking information 
were found to have no evidence of any covered labor market activity, only 
those sample members with some evidence of participation in the covered 
labor market were included, as it would be impossible to distinguish 
between non-participation in the covered labor market and unemployment 
(N=32,656).  Using the resulting employment information, indicators for 
quarterly employment status (non-zero earnings) were calculated for each 
sample member.  Basic demographic characteristics for the final sample are 
reported in Table 1.  In general, the sample closely mirrors the population 
of individuals sent from Cook County to the Illinois Department of 
Corrections.  Roughly 80% of the sample is African-American with the 
remainder split almost evenly between White and Hispanic individuals.41 
Only 10% of the sample is female.  The average age of the sample is thirty-
two. 
Because imprisonment removes prisoners from the conventional labor 
market, most studies with longitudinal measures of employment calculate 
quarterly employment and wage rates using synthetic or relative time, 
where the entry into prison and the exit from prison form the end of the pre-
treatment period and the beginning of the post-treatment period, 
respectively.42  This allows researchers to visualize the employment and 
wage trends of multiple prisoners going into and out of a period of 
imprisonment, something that would be impossible to do if these trends 
were shown using actual chronological (calendar) time.  Using this 
approach, the substantial drop in employment leading up to entry into 
prison has been routinely observed.43 
Figure 1a replicates this finding using quarterly employment rates for 
Cook County felony cases sentenced for the first time to the Illinois 
Department of Corrections between 2000 and 2005.  Since imprisonment is 
presumed to have no effect on employment and wages in the period leading 
up to imprisonment, one possible interpretation of this precipitous drop in 
 
 40 See Loeffler, supra note 6, at 147.  
 41 See Charles E. Loeffler, Estimating the Effects of Imprisonment on the Life-Course 
(May 6, 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with author).  
 42 See, e.g., LaLonde & Cho, supra note 6, at 247; Kling, Incarceration Length, supra 
note 5, at 867 (2006); Pettit & Lyons, supra note 5, at 240. 
 43 Harding et al., supra note 6, at 70–71.  
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employment would be some selection process similar to that observed in 
the literature on returns to job training.44  In those studies, pre-program 
drops in employment were linked to selection into program participation 
itself.45  Essentially, the recently unemployed workers sought out or were 
referred to job-training programs as a result of their economic distress.46  If 
this same logic held for soon-to-be prisoners, it would suggest that they too 
were struggling economically prior to their arrest, conviction, and 
imprisonment and that the criminal justice system caught them at the nadir 
of a downward employment spiral.  Due to the rarity of pre-arrest measures 
in the criminological literature, this narrative is especially intriguing.  If this 
downward dip indeed signaled general difficulties among the soon-to-be 
imprisoned, it would have significant implications both for expectations of 
subsequent criminal activity and for the potential to develop more effective 
criminal justice interventions through employment services, job training, 
and other programs designed to increase labor market participation and 
performance even among the population with repeated involvement with 
the criminal justice system. 
As intriguing as this hypothesis is, a more complete explanation for 
the pre-imprisonment decline must take into account any potential negative 
effects of arrest and pretrial incarceration on employment.  As their cases 
wind their way through the courts, the typical soon-to-be prisoner in Cook 
County spends several months in pretrial custody.47  Even for those 
individuals who are allowed to spend this period in the community on 
pretrial release, the arrest event leading to eventual imprisonment may 
sufficiently disrupt their labor market participation that the time from arrest 
to imprisonment may nonetheless be an extended period of 
unemployment.48  Furthermore, the period from arrest to eventual 
imprisonment is filled with court hearings, which, independent of any 
effects of arrest, may affect the likelihood of employment and the extent of 
any earnings.49  If even one of these factors held true for the soon-to-be 
imprisoned, then the pre-imprisonment decline in employment that was 
 
 44 See Heckman et al., supra note 8, at 1932; Ashenfelter, Effects, supra note 8, at 51 
(reporting entry-into-training-program drops in employment); Ashenfelter & Card, 
Longitudinal Structure, supra note 8, at 648 (illustrating the use and limitations of 
longitudinal earnings data for the estimation job training program effects).  
 45 Ashenfelter, Effects, supra note 8, at 57. 
 46 Ashenfelter & Card, Longitudinal Structure, supra note 8, at 648. 
 47 BUREAU JUST. ASSISTANCE, supra note 36, at 35.  
 48 See Dobbie et al., supra note 14, at 214. 
 49 See id; see also Holzer et al., supra note 3, at 118. 
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attributable to independent economic distress would be accordingly 
diminished. 
In order to test for the effects of pretrial case processing effects on pre-
imprisonment employment, three different empirical tests were conducted.  
The first test for the effects of pretrial case processing on pre-imprisonment 
employment levels compares the pre-imprisonment employment levels as 
measured from the quarter of entry into prison to the pre-imprisonment 
employment levels as measured from the quarter of arrest eventually 
leading to imprisonment.  If the employment trajectories of the soon-to-be 
arrested also manifest the geometric declines observed among the soon-to-
be imprisoned, then positive selection may be at work.  If, however, the 
employment trajectories of the soon-to-be arrested are stable going into the 
quarter of arrest, then it is much more likely that post-arrest/pre-
imprisonment case processing are contributing to the observed geometric 
declines in employment. 
The second empirical test compares the pre-imprisonment employment 
levels of the imprisoned more formally.  Equation 1 defines Yit as a dummy 
variable indicating a prisoner’s employment status in a given calendar 
quarter.  captures the time-varying relationship between subsequent 
imprisonment and the employment probabilities of sample members, where 
time is calculated relative to imprisonment. 
      
The relationship between employment and quarter relative to 
imprisonment is estimated separately for each of the ten quarters leading up 
to the first sentence to imprisonment for an individual sample member.  For 
all other quarters prior to imprisonment, the relationship is jointly 
estimated.  Also in equation 1,  is an individual-specific intercept and  
is an independently distributed error time-varying error term.  This equation 
is then re-estimated with a dummy variable indicating whether the sample 
member was incarcerated during a given quarter.  Quarterly pre-
imprisonment incarceration status was imputed using each sample 
member’s credit for time served awarded at the time of sentencing to 
estimate the quarter in which they began earning credit towards any 
eventual prison sentence.  Due to the imprecision of this measure of pretrial 
incarceration, with some small number of individuals not given credit for 
periods of pretrial detention, it is likely that this estimator is a lower-bound 
estimate on the effects of pretrial incarceration on pre-imprisonment 
employment.  Finally, the equation is re-estimated using an alternative time 
definition.  Instead of estimating relative to imprisonment, the equation is 
re-estimated using time to arrest leading to imprisonment.  For all of these 
estimates, individual fixed effects and robust standard errors were used. 
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The third empirical test examines the wage trends for individuals who 
were employed prior to imprisonment.  For this group, earnings trends 
relative to the two alternative synthetic time definitions are graphed in order 
to see whether wages conditional on employment in the period leading up 
to arrest are changing as rapidly as wages during the period immediately 
prior to imprisonment.50  If they are, this could mean either hours worked or 
wages are changing.  However, a rapid change in wages likely reflects a 
change in the hours worked and the absence of any change in wages during 
the pre-arrest period likely would mean that sample members are 
experiencing neither additional distress nor changes in their time allocation 
during the period prior to their contact with the criminal justice system. 
III. RESULTS 
The significant explanatory power of looking prior to arrest leading to 
imprisonment as opposed to looking only prior to imprisonment itself can 
be seen by examining synthetic time graphs using two different relative 
time definitions—the quarter of arrest and the quarter of imprisonment 
(Figure 1b).  If the pre-imprisonment drop in employment extends back 
beyond the quarter of arrest leading to imprisonment, then the attribution of 
this decline to non-criminal justice contact factors (i.e., independent 
economic distress) is strengthened.   However, if no such pre-arrest drop is 
observed, then the pre-imprisonment drop is almost certainly concentrated 
in the period between arrest and imprisonment, suggesting that criminal 
justice processes are the principal cause. 
The pattern that emerges is one in which a substantial portion of the 
pre-imprisonment drop in employment disappears when an earlier starting 
date is used.  Examining the trends for quarterly employment prior to the 
quarter of arrest reveals little decay in employment rates until the quarter of 
arrest. This suggests that the large pre-imprisonment employment drop 
reflects a considerable quantity of post-arrest employment losses, which are 
most readily explained by the adverse effects of some combination of 
arrest, court appearances, pretrial confinement, and conviction.  The 
substantially smaller drop in employment in the quarters prior to arrest also 
suggests that, unlike the pre-enrollment employment drops seen with many 
job training programs, which are primarily reflections of lives in economic 
distress, the employment patterns of soon-to-be prisoners are more 
complicated.  The otherwise relatively stable (albeit low) employment 
patterns seem to be interrupted only slightly by independent economic 
 
 50 Wages are inflation-adjusted to 2009 dollars. 
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troubles and much more substantially by the precipitous effects of arrest, 
jail, and eventually prison. 
This understanding of the employment situation of the soon-to-be 
imprisoned is reinforced by the statistical tests of significance reported in 
Table 2.  Beginning in the fourth quarter prior to imprisonment, 
employment rates are significantly lower than the long-term trend for 
sample members (Column 1).  Employment rates are approximately 5% 
lower four quarters before imprisonment, 10% lower three quarters before 
imprisonment, 20% lower two quarters before imprisonment, and 50% 
lower in the quarter prior to the quarter of imprisonment.  Once a measure 
of quarterly pretrial incarceration status is added to the regression equation, 
the magnitude of the relationship between pre-imprisonment quarter and 
employment is halved.  The decline in the fourth pre-imprisonment quarter 
is non-existent and even the decline in the quarter prior to the quarter of 
imprisonment is reduced to less than 20% of the long-term trend.  Still, the 
basic trajectory of the pre-imprisonment decline in employment remains 
across the four quarters prior to imprisonment, just at a lower level than was 
observed when no effort was made to account for pretrial incarceration 
status in the quarters before imprisonment. 
Column 3 reports the results of the re-estimation of the regression of 
employment status on dummy variables for the quarters leading up to 
imprisonment, but instead of estimating relative to imprisonment, the 
dummy variables represent the quarters prior to the arrest event leading to 
eventual conviction and sentencing to imprisonment.  In contrast to the 
results reported in Column 1 and consistent with the graphical test reported 
in Figure 2, employment rates relative to quarter of arrest are stable or 
significantly above their long-term trends in all but the quarter of arrest 
leading to eventual imprisonment.  The absence of any significant decline 
in employment in the quarters prior to arrest leading to imprisonment 
provides the strongest evidence that pretrial events, be they jail, court, or 
other, are responsible for the employment declines observed in the pre-
imprisonment period.  However, the fact that not all of the pre-
imprisonment declines are absorbed by the addition of a measure of pretrial 
custodial status—albeit an imperfect one—suggests that pretrial 
incarceration may not provide a comprehensive explanation for pre-
imprisonment declines.  It is possible that conviction effects or other 
endogenous events may offer explanation for this remaining decline in 
employment. 
Additional evidence in support of this perspective can be found in an 
examination of quarterly earnings for prisoners employed prior to arrest and 
imprisonment (Figure 2).  Quarterly earnings for the employed are 
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essentially flat throughout the period leading up to the arrest event leading 
to imprisonment.  This suggests that for the subset of soon-to-be prisoners 
who are employed in the UI-covered economy, their labor market 
performance is unaffected by their impending arrest.  However, when 
earnings relative to imprisonment are analyzed, another interesting feature 
of the employment of the soon-to-be imprisoned emerges.  As this group 
experiences arrest events leading to pretrial incarceration, the employment 
rate drops, but this mechanical increase in unemployment does not draw 
evenly from the distribution of those employed in the previous quarter.  
Instead, this new unemployment draws heavily from those workers with the 
lowest reported wage earnings.  This results in a rapid increase in average 
earnings for those workers who retain employment until their eventual 
imprisonment.  Put simply, those prisoners with relatively higher paying 
jobs or more regular job hours are able to maintain employment longer than 
lower-paid and lower-working-hour workers.  Given that stable 
employment is one of the factors considered by judges when deciding 
whether a defendant should be held in pretrial custody, this result is to be 
expected.51  Nonetheless, it provides a further indication that employment 
and pretrial detention are negatively correlated. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
As far as we can tell from UI-based wage data, the soon-to-be 
imprisoned do not manifest evidence that they are experiencing any more or 
less economic distress than usual in the quarter leading up to the arrests that 
lead to their eventual imprisonment.  As such, it appears that their arrests 
are uncorrelated with their formal labor market performance, which could 
be considered as an otherwise random, albeit highly disruptive, event in the 
economic and social life of the soon-to-be imprisoned.  This raises the 
question: why are arrests leading to imprisonment not preceded by more 
signs of economic distress? 
Several plausible explanations for this lack of pre-arrest economic 
distress exist.  First, it is worth reiterating that economic distress is the 
norm for soon-to-be prisoners.52  Past studies using administrative data have 
generated considerable evidence of economic distress both before and after 
 
 51 See Stephen Demuth, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Pretrial Release Decisions and 
Outcomes: A Comparison of Hispanic, Black, and White Felony Arrestees, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 
873, 881 (2003) (discussing theories of judicial decision-making).  
 52 ADAM LOONEY & NICHOLAS TURNER, BROOKINGS INST., WORK AND OPPORTUNITY 
BEFORE AND AFTER INCARCERATION 1, 7 (2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/upl
oads/2018/03/es_20180314_looneyincarceration_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/WN2Y-U4XG]. 
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arrests leading to imprisonment.53  And even surveys of prisoners, which 
show higher rates of employment (roughly 70%),54 presume such a high 
rate of pretrial incarceration that they generally do not ask prison inmates 
about labor market activity in the period between arrest and 
imprisonment55—suggesting either an opportunity for additional research or 
further evidence of the profoundly disruptive effect that pretrial 
incarceration has on the economic lives of the soon-to-be imprisoned. 
Second, it is also possible that legitimate earnings activity can be 
accompanied by illegal activities.  Numerous studies have shown that 
illegal earnings can be intermittent, and part- or full-time employment in 
the legal labor market has the potential to produce complementary wages.56  
It is even possible that these two forms of employment are not simply 
complementary opportunities to smooth inconsistent returns from illegal 
earnings activity, but that legal employment can give rise to expanded 
opportunities for illegal earnings through theft, drug selling, or other illegal 
activity.57  Whether or not legal and illegal earnings are complementary, it 
appears that participation in the legal labor market does not preclude 
participation in illegal acts, which is just to say that criminal activities are 
not limited to the unemployed.  However, the reverse may not be true, as 
suggested by John Hagan’s work on the social embeddedness of crime58 
 
 53 See, e.g., LaLonde & Cho, supra note 6, at 246; Kling, Incarceration Length, supra 
note 5, at 867–68; Loeffler, supra note 6, at 157; David J. Harding et al., supra note 6, at 68.  
 54  CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA & JENNIFER C. KARBERG, BUREAU JUST. STAT., DRUG USE 
AND DEPENDENCE, STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONERS, 2004 1, 8 (2007).  
 55 BUREAU JUST. STAT., THE SURVEY OF INMATES IN STATE CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 
AND THE SURVEY OF INMATES IN FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES QUESTIONNAIRE (2004), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/sisfcf04_q.pdf. (source on file with author).  
 56 See Jeffrey Fagan, Drug Selling and Licit Income in Distressed Neighborhoods: The 
Economic Lives of Street-Level Drug Users and Dealers, in DRUGS, CRIME, AND SOCIAL 
ISOLATION: BARRIERS TO URBAN OPPORTUNITY 100, 129 (Adelle V. Harrell & George E. 
Peterson eds., 1992) [hereinafter Drug Selling] (finding that legal labor market participation 
competed with criminal work); see also Jeffrey Fagan, Women and Drugs Revisited: Female 
Participation in the Cocaine Economy, 24 J. DRUG ISS. 179, 179 (1994) [hereinafter Women] 
(finding that women involved in drug markets engage in a variety of income-generating 
activities, both legal and illegal); Jeffrey Fagan & Richard B. Freeman, Crime and Work, 25 
CRIME & JUST. 225, 234–59 (1999) (reporting that many criminal offenders engage in both 
legal and illegal work in succession or often simultaneously); PETER REUTER ET AL., MONEY 
FROM CRIME: A STUDY OF THE ECONOMICS OF DRUG DEALING IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 62–66 
(1990) (discussing legal and illegal sources of income among individuals arrested on drug 
charges). 
 57 See Jeffrey Fagan, Drug Selling, supra note 56, at 129. 
 58 See Hagan, supra note 32, at 486 (arguing for the importance of adolescent crime and 
criminal justice involvement for understanding future adult unemployment). 
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and Richard Freeman’s work on crime and labor market participation.59  
Both scholars suggest that rather than unemployment leading to crime, 
participation in crime can lead to subsequent unemployment, where the 
mechanism of unemployment can either be contact with the criminal justice 
system or social selection into a trajectory of continued criminal 
involvement largely disconnected from the conventional labor market.  This 
embedding or selection process, under this analysis, then restricts the ability 
of crime-involved individuals to participate in the legitimate economy at 
any future time at which they attempt to do so. 
Regardless of why arrests leading to imprisonment are not preceded by 
more signs of economic distress, the substantial and mechanical disruption 
caused by arrest and pretrial incarceration suggests that future work on the 
labor market experiences of prisoners could benefit from improved 
measures of pretrial incarceration status.  In fact, there are two distinct 
benefits that could come from collecting and analyzing this additional 
information.  For the purposes of estimating the effects of imprisonment on 
subsequent probabilities of employment and earnings, pre-imprisonment 
information on prisoner employment and earnings is useful for estimating 
the within-individual labor market effects of imprisonment.  However, if 
imprisonment is always or nearly always preceded by a precipitous drop in 
employment and earnings, then typical empirical strategies for estimating 
the effects of imprisonment on employment and earnings may misestimate 
the true causal effects of imprisonment.  Past employment and earnings are 
time-varying confounding variables.60  As such, they are ill-suited for use in 
a fixed effects regression research design, which assumes that fixed effects 
will only be used to control for time-invariant differences between 
individuals. 
A lagged dependent variable estimation strategy offers a useful 
alternative to fixed effects regression.  By examining the employment 
immediately before and after imprisonment, a comparison of quarterly 
employment for the several quarters before imprisonment will compare 
economic performance already lowered by arrest, pretrial custody, and 
conviction to economic performance with the added effects of 
imprisonment.  While this may seem reasonable enough, this configuration 
precludes the possibility of first measuring the lagged effects of arrest, 
detention, and earnings, since these quantities are obscured by the non-
lagged effects of subsequent imprisonment.  Previous attempts to resolve 
 
 59 Freeman, Disadvantaged Youths, supra note 12, at 201.  
 60 For more details on time-varying confounders, see ANGRIST & PISCHKE, supra note 34, 
at 113. For more details on prisoner reentry, see PETERSILIA, supra note 2, at 3–20.  
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this problem by implicitly or explicitly examining non-imprisoned 
individuals and comparing their trajectories to those of imprisoned 
individuals rests upon the assumption that they share similar enough 
economic trajectories to allow for an unbiased estimation of 
imprisonment’s effects.61  Unfortunately, this assumption seems unlikely to 
be true.62   The soon-to-be imprisoned are much more likely to experience 
an extended period of pretrial detention than the non-soon-to-be 
imprisoned.63  For these reasons, it seems that panel data of earnings for 
prisoners are unlikely to provide an isolated estimate of the effects of 
imprisonment and instead provide an estimate of the joint effects of arrest, 
pretrial detention, conviction, and eventual imprisonment. 
Collecting better information on the pretrial incarceration of prisoners 
and the employment trajectories of incarcerated non-prisoners could also be 
quite valuable for another reason.  Studies of the employment experiences 
of ex-prisoners have repeatedly noted a temporary employment boost 
immediately after release from prison.64  The exact cause of this spike has 
not been fully explored.  It has been speculated that this could be due to 
parole work requirements or other features of the prison reentry process.65  
Having employment information on ex-jail inmates who are not then sent to 
prison could help shed light on whether these employment spikes are a 













 61 See, e.g., Western, Impact of Incarceration, supra note 2, at 528.  
 62 See Apel & Sweeten, supra note 6, at 459–62. 
 63 Marian R Williams, A Comparison of Sentencing Outcomes for Defendants with 
Public Defenders Versus Retained Counsel in a Florida Circuit Court 23 JUSTICE SYSTEM 
JOURNAL 249, 254 (2002).  
 64 Sabol, supra note 5, at 269; LaLonde & Cho, supra note 6, at 247; Jung, supra note 5, 
at 507; Kling, Incarceration Length, supra note 5, at 868.  
 65 See Sabol, supra note 5, at 270, 291. 
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